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LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE MILITARY OCCUPANT
UNDER ARTICLE. 43, HAGUE REGULATIONS
EDMUND H. SCHWENKt
Article 43, contained in Part IV, Section III, of the Hague Conven-
tion, was designed to limit the legislative power of the military occu-
pant. In the authoritative French text it appears as follows:
"L'autorit6 du pouvoir l6gal ayant passC- de fait entre les
mains de l'occupant, celui-ci prendra toutes les mesures qui depend-
ent de lui en vue de r6tablir et d'assurer, autant qu'il est possible,
l'ordre et la vie publics en respectant, sauf empchement absolu,
les lois en vigeur dans le pays." z
While a literal reading seems to indicate that some legislation by the
military occupant is permitted, according to one theory 2 applied in
I t Attorney, Office of the Solicitor, Department of the Interior. The opinions eaxprezczed
in this article represent the personal views of the author and are not necessarily those of any
government department.
1. Strangely enough, the semi-official English translation of Article 43 has never been
correct. As given in 2 ScoTT, THE IAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907 (1909)
397, it reads as follows:
"The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands
of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore and
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless abso-
lutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."
A comparison of the original French text with the English translation shows that the French
term "Ia vie publique" has been translated into "safety." The literal translation of "la vie
publique" is "public life." The actual meaning of "Ia vie publique" was explained at the
Convention of Brussels, session of Aug. 12, 1874, by Baron Lambermont, Belgian representa-
tive, as "des fonctions sociales, des transactions ordinaires, qui constituent la vie de tous lea
jours" (social functions, ordinary transactions which constitute daily life). ACTES DE LA
CONFARENCE DE BRUXELLES DE 1874 (Brussels, 1899) 135; MxNISrAn DES AFFAIRS ETRAN-
GARES, AcREs DE LA CONFARENCE DE BRUXELLES DE 1874 (Paris, 1874) 23; 4 MAnTErs,
NoUvEAu RECUEIL GAtRtAL DE TAITrs (2d ser.) (1879) 77.
As a result, the term "civil life" would seem to come closest to the meaning of "Ia vie
publique."
See also 2 WHEATON, INTERNATIONAL LAW (6th Eng. ed., Keith, 1929) 783:
"The words public order and safety do not represent exactly the meaning of
the original Tordre et la vie publics,' which refer also to the entire social and
commercial life of the community."
It is therefore suggested that the English version of Article'43 should read as follows:
"The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands
of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore and
ensure, as far as possible, public order and civil life, while respecting, unless pre-
vented, the laws in force in the country."
2. See PILLET, LEs Lois Ac'ruE.ES DE LA GUERRE (2d ed. 1898) 241; BERIIER, DE
L'OccUPATION AILITAIRE (1881) 93; FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL EconiOMc LAW
OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION (1942) § 498, p. 148, n. 3.
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various decisions I the occupant has no right at all to enact legislative
measures, and the laws he does impose are mere "commands of the
3. See Cambier v. Lebrun, Belgian Ct. of Cass., Dec. 4, 1919, [1920] 1 PASICRISl.
BELGE 1; WILLIAMS AND LAUTERPACHT (eds.), ANNUAL DIGEST OF PUnLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW CASES: 1919-1922 (1932), No. 325, p. 459; 6 HACKWORTII, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1943) 396. By an order of the German Governor-General in Belgium of Feb. 10, 1915,
arbitral tribunals for rent were set up and the ordinary courts of first instance were given
jurisdiction on appeal from decisions of these tribunals. A judgment was rendered in exer-
cise of this jurisdiction by the Court of Namur (April 3, 1917) as first instance. Appellant
asked to quash the judgment. His application was dismissed. The Court of Cassation said:
"It must be admitted that decisions rendered by courts established under the order of the
German Governor-General in Belgium of February 10, 1915, bind the parties. However,
these tribunals are not a creation of Belgian law. The decrees of the occupying power, what-
ever they may be, do not emanate from the exercise of national sovereignty. They have
not the validity of Belgian law, but are merely ommands of the enemy military authority,
and are not incorporated in the legislation or the institutions of the country." '
See also Postula v. City of Liege, Belgian Ct. of Cass., April 29, 1919, [1919] 1 PASIcRIsIE
BELGE 132. See, to the same effect, decisions of the Belgian Ct. of Cass. of Jan. 21, 1918,
[1918] 1 id. at 177; April 29, 1919, [1919] 1 id. at 132; Oct. 16, 1919, [1919] 1 id. at 225, Dcc, 4,
1919, [1920] 1 id. at 1; Jan. 20, 1920, [1920] 3 id. at 168.
As a result of Cambier v. Lebrun, the officials of the court were forbidden to issue for the
purpose of executing judgment copies of the decisions rendered by the courts set up by the
occupying power on the ground that such a step would tend to contribute a legal character
to acts of force alien to the national sovereignty. Official Circular of Dec. 6, 1919, (1920) 78
LA BELGIQUE JUDICIAIRE 12.
In Mathot v. Longu6, Belgian Ct. of App., Liege, Feb. 19, 1921, (1921) 79 LA BELGIQUH
JUDICAIRE 438; WILLIAMS AND LAUTERPACHT, op. cit. supra note 3, No. 329, p. 463; 6 HACK-
WORTH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 396, a German order of Aug. 8, 1918 prohibited the sale of
vegetables before they had been gathered. A bargain of this kind had been made by the
parties in this case. Mathot not having performed the contract, Longu6 brought an action
for recission and damages and was successful in the court of first instance. Mathot appealed.
He based his appeal chiefly on the invalidity of the contract under the German Order of
Aug. 8. The Court of Appeals of Liege dismissed the appeal. It rejected the appellant's
contention that due to the ratification of the Hague Convention by Belgium in 1910 the
orders of the occupant are not merely commands of the military authority, but laws, The
court said:
" 'This inference, logically and legally inadmissible, is based on a false prem-
ise-that is to say, the admission . .. that Article 43 of the Hague Convention
- conferred upon the occupying Power a positive right to legislate; but .. . it is
inaccurate to say that by virtue of the Convention the occupant has been given any
portion whatever of the legislative power; .. . it appears from the text of the
Convention itself and from the preliminary work that all that was intended . . .
was to restrict the abuse of force by the occupant and not to give him or recognize
him as possessing any authority in the sphere of law.' The law remains the apanage
of the national authority exclusively, the occupant possessing de facto power and
nothing more. It follows from that, that the Belgian law of 1910 could not and
did not recognize the de facto power of the occupant as having the right to legis
late.
"Moreover, to admit that the occupying power has any right to legislate . . .
would'be to create very possibly and frequently an insoluble conflict between the
decrees of the legal authority and those issued by the de facto power; this is in-
admissible as being contrary to the absolute character of sovereignty. It followed
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military authority of the occupant." The weight of authority, how-
ever, recognizes the occupant's right to legislate since the clause
"respecting the laws of the country unless absolutely prevented" would
be meaningless if the occupant had no legislative power whatsoever.
While it seems thus well established that the occupant is not pro-
hibited from legislating under the principles of international lawv, the
necessity of determining the extent to which this power to legislate is
limited by Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, raises a number of
problems.
APPLICATION OF THE LilITATIONS IMPOSED BY ARTICLE 43
A literal interpretation of Article 43 seems to indicate that the
military occupant is authorized to enact legislative measures only in so
far as they restore public order and civil life, i.e., are concerned with
the common interest or the interest of the population, 4 and that he is
prohibited from legislating in fields other than those designed to restore
public order and civil life, i.e., in promotion of his military interests.-
Such a limitation of the legislative power of the occupant, however,
would be inconsistent with the principle expressed in Article 43 that
the entire authority of the legislative power has, in fact, passed into
the hands of the occupant.6
Under a literal construction of Article 43 it might also seem that the
limitations imposed on the exercise of legislative power apply only to
measures designed to restore public order and civil life, but not to
other legislative measures. Most writers on international la however,
take it for granted that the limitations contained in Article 43 govern
the entire field of legislation,7 and only two, Hyde 8 and Meurer,9 have
recognized the existence of this problem.
from these considerations that the Order of S August 1918, emanating from a de
facto power, had no legal value and could not acquire such a value by virtue of the
Belgian Law of 1910, and that the Belgian courts could not base their decisions on
such a decree."
4. This is the interpretation of the phrase "to restore and ensure public order and
civil life" given by MIEURER, DM VOELKERRECHTLICU STELLuNG DER vO!! FtuD ESurTz-
TEN GEBIETE (Tubingen, 1915) 23.
5. This is the interpretation of legislative acts not included in the term "restoration of
public order and civil life" by EURER, op. cit. supranote4, at 23.
6. See MEURER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 18.
7. F.EILCENFELD, op. cit. supra note 2, § 324, p. 89; 2 GARNEP, lN-rEMRNATOz.AL LAW
AND THE WORLD WAR (1920) 5; HLLL, INTERNATIONAL LAW (Sth ed., Higgins, 1924) 465;
2 OPPE,,mmI, INTEFRN',ATioNAL LAW (5th ed., Lauterpacht, 1935) § 169, pp. 349-50; WILso.,
HANDBooK OF INTERNATONAL LAW (3d ed. 1939) § 129, p. 310; Stauffenberg, Ierraglid:e
Beziehungen des Okkupanten zu den Landescinwohnern (1931) 2 ZErrscRnWT FuER Aus-
LAENDIsCHES oEFFENTLIcHEs RECHT UNID VOELKERRECET 103.
S. 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1922) § 690, pp. 367-S: "Thus in restoring putlia
order and safety he appears to be bound to make serious endeavor to continue in force the
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The history of Article 43 verifies the general view that the limitations
were designed to apply to the entire field of legislation. The predeces-
sors of Article 43 are Article 2 and 3 of the Declaration of Brussels of
1874. Article 2 of the Declaration of Brussels reads as follows:
"L'autorit6 du pouvoir" I6gal 6tant suspendue et ayant pass6
de fait entre Ies mains de l'occupant, celui-ci prendra toutes les
mesures qui d6pendent de Iui en vue de r6tablir et d'assurer,
autant qu'il est possible, l'ordre et la vie publique." '0
Article 3 provides:
"A cet effet, il maintiendra les lois qui 6taient en vigueur dans
le pays en temps de paix, et ne les modifiera, ne les suspendra ni les
remplacera que s'il y a ncessit6." 1
At the Hague Conference of 1899 an elaborate discussion developed
over whether Article 3 of the Brussels Declaration should be retained
to protect occupied countries from far-reaching legal changes 12 or
whether it should be eliminated because it concedes to any occupant
the right to exercise legislative power even before occupation has taken
place.1 3 Various drafts were submitted to reconcile these points of
ordinary civil and criminal laws which do not conflict with the security of his Army or its
support, efficacy, and success." (Emphasis supplied.)
9. MEURER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 23: "The Article 43 mentions the requirement of
nec6ssity only for the field of public order and civil life, that is for legislative acts in the
common interest or interest of the population. . . .Article 43 leaves a gap for legislative
acts in the military interest, which, according to v. Martens' formula, must be filled by the
principle of war usage, morals, and humanity. This probably also leads to the effect that
such legislative acts must be confined to those which are absolutely necessary." (Translation
by author.)
See also Davidonis, Some Problems of Military Government (1944) 38 A. POL. Sci. Ruv.
469.
. 10. "The authority of the legitimate power being suspended and having actually passed
into the hands of the Occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to reestablish and
insure, as far as possible, public order and safety." (Translation from HIGoINs, Tun HAGUE
PEACE CONFERENCE (1909) 273.)
11. "With this object he will maintain the laws which were in force in the country in
time of peace, and will only modify, suspend or replace them by others if necessity obliges
him to do so." (Translation from HIGGINs, loc. cit. supra note 10.)
12. This position was taken by v. Martens, Russian representative, although it was
later discarded by him, and by Lammasch, Austrian representative, as well as by v. Bildt,
Swedish-Norwegian representative. See 3 CONtRENCE INTERNATIONALE Dr LA PAIX (1899)
113-6, 120; PERuS, A HISTORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE AT THE HAGUE (1914) 66;
HOLLs, THE PEACE CONFERENCE AT THE HAGUE (1900) 137-8; 2 MEURER, DIE HAAo .R
FRIEDENS-KONFERENZ (1907) 209-10.
13. This position was taken by Beernaert, representative of Belgium, v. Martens,
Russian representative, after a change of mind, and Dutch General Den Beer Poortugael.
See 3 CONF*RENCE INTERNATIONALE DE LA PAIX (1899) 113: PERRIS, op. Cit. supra note 12,
at 157; 2 MEURER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 207-8.
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view, 14 but none of them was approved by the Conference. Finally,
Bihourd, the representative of France, suggested, 13 as a matter of
compromise, that while Article 3 should be canceled, its spirit should
be incorporated into Article 2 by the following clause: "en respectant,
sauf empchement absolu, les lois en vigueur dans le pays." This sug-
gestion was accepted by a vote of twenty-three against one (Japan)."
Thus it seems that Article 3 of the Declaration of Brussels retained
its character as a general principle even though it became attached to
Article 2, which dealt only with the duty of the occupant to restore
public and civil life. As a result, the limitations contained in Article 43
of the Hague Regulations apply to the entire field of legislation. More-
over, even under the view that the limitations of Article 43 should be
confined to legislative measures designed to restore public order and
civil life, it has been suggested that laws enacted in other fields should
be governed by limitations arising from war usage, morals and hu-
manity.' 7
Again, a literal interpretation of Article 43 might suggest that the
limitations apply only to laws but not to decrees or ordinances. But
such a theory, though it has been advanced,"8 is incompatible both
with the purpose of Article 43 and with the fact that the difference
14. Odier, Sn-s representative, submitted this draft:
"A cet effet, il maintiendra les lois qui 6taient en vigueur dans le pays en
temps de paix. ine pourra en suspendre I'ex~cution que dans la mesure et pour le
temps oil cela sera ncessaire en vue du maintien de l'ordre."
Rolin, representative of Siam, proposed the following draft:
"Les lois existantes restent en vigueur dans le territoire occup6 et si l'occupant
est amen6, par suite des ncessitls de la guerre A les modifier, A lea suspendre ou 1.
les remplacer, l'effet de cas mesures sera limit6 h l'ttendue et la durCe de l'occupa-
tion."
To meet Lammasch's objections against limiting occupation measures for the time of
occupation, Rolin submitted a new draft:
"Les lois e.xistantes restent en vigueur dans le territoire occup6 et Si l'occupant
est amen6, par suite des n~essits de la guerre, b. les modifier, Zt lea suspandre ou a
les remplacer, ces mesures n'auront qu'un caract&re purement provisoire limit6
suivant l'ltendue et Ia duroe de l'occupation."
3 CONFARENCE INTERNATIONALE DE LA PALX (1899) 122-3, 126, 164: 2 MEUREn, op. Cit.
supra note 12, at 228, 230.
15. 3 CONrARENCE INTERN.ATxONALE DE LA PALX (1399) 127; 2 MEurLER, op. cit. supra
note 12, at 230.
16. 3 CONFARENCE INTERNATIONALE DE LA P..x (1899) 127; 2 MEURR, op. Cit. sutpra
note 12, at 230.
Motono, the Japanese representative, declined at first to vote for Bihourt's propoal
on the ground that Article 2 speaks only of maintenance of public order and civil life,
whereas Article 3 expresses a general principle of limiting the legislative power of the occu-
pant. He thought Article 3 would lose its meaning if it would be attached to Article 2.
However, due to the efforts of some representatives, Motono reversed his vote.
17. This construction has been suggested by MEURER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 23.
18. See MEURER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 241.
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between laws on the one hand, and decrees or ordinances on the other,
is one of form rather than of substance.19
Granting that Article 43 applies to decrees and ordinances as well as
to laws, it does not necessarily follow that it applies to "ordinary" as
well as to "extraordinary" laws, decrees, and ordinances. At least it
was so held in the famous case of Cillekens v. DeHaas,20 which involved
an.order of the German Governor General in Belgium terminating a
moratorium previously established by the King of the Belgians for the
duration of the war. In an action of debt brought by the plaintiff, the
defendant conceded plaintiff's claim, but invoked the moratorium,
maintaining that the German Governor's cancellation order was illegal
because it was contrary to Article 43. The court, however, gave judg-
ment for plaintiff on the ground that the limitations of Article 43 apply
to ordinary laws but not to war measures and that therefore the mora-
torium had been validly terminated.
Interpretation of the Clause "restore and ensure public order and civil
life." Article 43 by its express language confines respect for the existing
laws of the occupied country to those measures which are designed "to
restore and ensure public order and civil life." At the Convention of
Brussels the meaning of 'Tordre" and "la vie publique" was discussed
by Baron Lambermont. The record on this point reads as follows:
"M. le baron Lambermont demande ce qu'il faut entendre
par ordre. I1 y a ordre mat6riel, civil, social politique. M. le
d~l6gu6 de Belgique pr6sume qu'on a seulement en vue la s6curit6
ou la sflret6 g6n~rale; quant A l'expression 'vie publique', il pense
qu'il s'agit des fonctions sociales, des transactions ordinaires, qui
constituent la vie de tousles jours.
La commission interpr~te ce mot dans le m~me sens que M. le
baron Lambermont. On mettra: 'l'ordre et la vie publics.' " 21
This discussion suggests that by 'Tordre" the Convention meant
"security or general safety" and by "la vie publique" it thought of
"social functions [and] ordinary transactions which constitute daily
life."
While the occupant can restore public order and civil life only when
they have been disrupted, he may legislate to ensure them in the
absence of any disturbance. Hence the terms "restoration" and "en-
surance" are used alternatively rather than jointly. In the case of
Ville d'Anvers v. Etat allemand,2 2 the German-Belgian Arbitration
19. STRUPP, DAS INTERNATIONALE LANDKRIEGSRECHT (1914) 99, n. 2.
20. Cillekens v. DeHaas, Dutch Dist. Ct., Rotterdam, May 14, 1919, WILLIAMS AND
LAUTERPACHT, op. cit. supra note 3, No. 336, p. 471, 6 HACKWORTII, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 395.
21. MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES tTRANGARES, ACTES DE LA CONFkRENCE DE BRUXELLES
DE 1874 (Paris, 1874) 23.
22. Ville d'Anvers v. ]tat allemand, German-Belgian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, Oct. 19,
1925, (1925) 5 RECUEIL DES DECISIONS DES TRIBUNAUX ARBITRAUX MIxTES 712, 6 HACK-
WORTH, op. cit. supra, at 395-6.
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Tribunal left this question open when it denied the validity of a Ger-
man decree of February 3, 1915 in Belgium on the ground that there
was neither a need for restoration nor one for maintenance of public
order and civil life. In the cases of Boclart z. Committee of Supplies of
Corneaux 23 and De Brabant and Gosselin v. T. and A. Florant 24 the
Belgian courts reached contrary conclusions in regard to a German
decree of August 8, 1918 which had declared void all purchases of
vegetables not yet gathered. Whereas in the Bochart case the Court of
Appeals of Libge held that the occupant took his action with a view to
regulating and diminishing the exorbitant price of vegetables, the
Court of Appeals of Brussels declared in the Brabant case that "the
German order was not made with a view to ensuring public order and
security, but to starving the population."
Thus it follows that, when public order and civil life have remained
undisturbed, the validity of legislation under Article 43 depends on
whether or not the legislating occupant was motivated by a desire to
ensure them. There seems little doubt that the term "to ensure public
order and civil life" is not a definite and certain concept, but a notion
depending on the circumstances of the particular case. This has been
most aptly suggested by Leurquin:
"Article 43 of the Hague Convention of the 18th October,
1907, concerning military authority in the territory of the enemy
State, enjoins upon the occupant to take all measures in his power
to ensure public order and safety, 'observing, save where there is
absolute hindrance, the laws of the country.' It results from this
provision that the occupant is authorized, in case of necessity, to
make modifications in the laws. It could not be otherwise. When the
occupation is prolonged, and when owing to the war the economic
and social position of the occupied country undergoes profound
changes, it is perfectly evident that new legislative measures are
essential sooner or later." 25
Significance of the Clause "sauf emp~chwnent absolu." Article 43 does
not compel the occupant to respect the laws of the occupied country in
cases of "emp~chement absolu." What does "empechement absolu"
mean? Literally taken, the clause "sauf empecbement absolu" has no
23. Bochart v. Committee of Supplies of Corneux, Belgian Ct. of App., Litge, Feb. 28,
1920, WILLAMs AND LAUTERPACHT, op. Cit. supra note 3, No. 327, p. 462.
24. De Brabant and Gosselin v. T. and A. Florant, Belgian Ct. of App., BrusZels,
July 22,1920, WILLItS AND LAUTERPACHT, op. Cit. supra note 3, No. 328, p. 463.
25. Leurquin, The German Occupation in Belgium and Article 43 of The Hague Conren-
lion of the 18th October 1907 (1916) 1 INT. L. NOTEs 55. See, to the same effect, v. Llszr,
DAs VoEmxEmPcnr (12th ed., Fleischmann, 1925) § 61, p. 491: "The longer the occupation
lasts, the more comprehensive will be the interference ith the administration and legisla-
tion of the occupied country for its own sake." (Translation by author.) See aL-o Davidonis,
supra note 9, at 469.
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meaning at all, since the occupant is never absolutely prevented from
respecting the laws of the occupied country. 6 It takes on meaning only
if it is completed by a phrase such as "by necessity," "by the interest
of the population," or "by the new order of things." It is therefore not
astonishing that the scope of this clause has been stated in different
terms. President McKinley, in his order to the Secretary of War on
the occupation of Santiago de Cuba by the American forces, speaks of a
"new order of things," which justifies changes of legislation of the
occupied country.2 Hyde states that the occupant is absolutely pre-
vented from respecting the laws of the occupied country if they con-
flict "with the security of his army or its support, efficacy, and suc-
cess." 1 Garner suggests that military security or interests is a test for
permissible change of the laws. 29 Wilson considers the occupant en-
titled to abrogate the existing laws of the occupied country if they are
"detrimental to the occupant." 30 Oppenheim submits that a change
of the laws of the occupant is permissible if "necessitated by [the occu-
pant's] interest," 31 or "by military necessity." 32 Feilchenfeld believes
that the laws may be changed if the change is "sufficiently justified." 11
Fenwick thinks that the occupant need not respect the laws of the
occupied country if they are not "compatible with the existence of a
state of war and the safety of the army of occupation." "4 Stauffenberg
regards a change of the laws of the occupied country permissible if it is
justified by "necessity of the war, public safety, and welfare of the
population." '3 Meurer takes the position that the existing laws in the
occupied country may be changed in so far as "unsurpassable military
obstacles exist." 36 He believes, however, that such "unsurpassable
obstacles" will soon turn out to be in existence. 3
The restoration of public order and civil life alms primarily, if not
exclusively, at the interest of the population." Hence, a construction
which confines the term "empechement absolu" to the military interest
of the occupant seems too narrow, if not actually incorrect. Such a
26. FEILCHENFELD, op. cit. supra note 2, § 325, p. 89.
27. Order to the Secretary of War, July 18, 1898, reprinted in 7 MooR, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1906) 261-3. See also HALL, op. cit. supra note 7, § 155, p. 560.
28. 2 HYDE, op. cit. supra note 8, § 60, p. 368.
29. 2 GARNER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 86.
30. WILSoN, op. cit. supra note 7, § 129, p. 3 1 5 .
31. 2 OPPENuEIM, op. cit. supra note 7, § 169, pp. 3 4 9 - 5 0 .
32. Oppenheim, The Legal Relations between an Occupying Power and the Inhabitants
(1917) 33 L. Q. REv. 365.
33. FEILCHENFELD, op. cit. supra note 2, § 325, p. 89.
34. FENwicK, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1934) 486.
35. Stauffenberg, supra note 7, at 103.
36. 2 MEURER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 338.
37. Id. at 238: "Such unsurpassable obstacles, which necessitate a change of law, will.
however, soon turn out to exist." (Translation by author.)
38. See note 4 supra.
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construction might even lead to the conclusion-actually dravm by
Cavar 39-that the occupant is barred from suspending and pro-
mulgating laws in the interest of the occupied country, a conclusion
which seems untenable in view of the fact that an occupation for a more
or less considerable period of time necessarily requires a change of the
laws in the interest of the population of the occupied country. It is
therefore submitted that the term "empechement absolu" means noth-
ing but "absolute necessity." 40 This interpretation is warranted by
the historical fact that the term is merely a rephrasing of the word
"necessity" in Article 3 of the Declaration of Brussels. As a result, the
occupant, in restoring public order and civil life, must respect the exist-
ing law of the occupied country unless he is prevented from doing so
by "absolute necessity."
The Rules of Land Warfare 41 which deal with the legislative power
of the United States military forces as occupants 42 seem to give "em-
p~chement absolu" a narrower construction. Rules 285 and 287 treat
39. Cavari, Quelques votions gbnrales sur l'occupation pacifique (1924) 31 RE% uE
GANARALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 352.
40. See MTEURER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 237: "Incidentally, Art. 3, Declaration of
Brussels, already permitted changes of the laws in case of 'necessity'; but this limitation,
expressed at the end of Art. 43, has been emphasized more sharply and more definitely."
(Translation by author.)
41. U.S. VR DEP'T, RULES oF LAND WVARFARE (Fi 27-10) (1940).
42. Rules 285-288 read as follows:
"285. The laws in force.-The principal object of the occupant is to provide
for the security of the invading army and to contribute to its support and efficiency
and the success of its operations. In restoring public order and safety he Will con-
tinue in force the ordinary civil and criminal laws of the occupied territory which
do not conflict with this object. These laws will be administered by the local offi-
cials as far as practicable. All crimes not of a military nature and which do not
affect the safety of the invading army are left to the jurisdiction of the local courts.
"286. Power to suspend and promulgate laws.-The military occupant may
suspend existing laws and promulgate new ones when the exigencies of the military
service demand such action.
"287. Nature of laws suspended.-The occupant will naturally alter or Eus-
pend all laws of a political nature as well as political privileges and all laws which
affect the welfare and safety of his command. Of this class are those relating to
recruitment in occupied territory, the right of assembly, the right to bear arms,
the right of suffrage, the freedom of the press, the right to quit or travel freely in
occupied territory. Such suspensions should be made known to the inhabitants.
"288. Nature of laws promulgated.-An occupant may create new laws for the
government of a country. He will promulgate such new laws and regulations as
military necessity demands. In this class will be included those laws which come
into being as a result of military rule; that is, those which establish new crimes and
offenses incident to a state of war and are necessary for the control of the country
and the protection of the army."
Cf. Article 366 of the English LAWS AND UsA.GES OF WAR ON LAND:
"If demanded by the exigencies of war, it is within the power of the occupant
to alter or suspend any of the existing laws, or to promulgate new ones, but im-
portant changes can seldom be necessary and should be avoided as far as possible."
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the suspension of existing laws; Rule 288, the promulgation of new
laws; and Rule 286, both the suspension of existing and promulgation
of new laws. Rule 285 states that, in the suspension of existing laws,
it is the principal object of the occupant "to provide for the security of
the invading army and to contribute to its support and efficiency and
the success of its operations," and provides that "in restoring public
order and safety [the occupant] will continue the ordinary civil and
criminal laws of the occupied territory which do not conflict with this
object."
Whereas Rule 285 deals with the suspension of laws only in so far
as the occupant restores public order and safety, Rule 286 deals with
the suspension of existing laws of the occupied country in general. As a
result, it would seem that in the legislative field of restoring public
order and safety, Rule 285 prevails over Rule 286 according to the
principle lex specialis derogat legi generali. In fields other than the
restoration of public order and safety, however, Rule 286 applies and
permits a change of the laws of the occupied country only if such a
change is necessitated by "the exigencies of the military service." As
far as the promulgation of "new laws is concerned, Rule 288 permits
such promulgation in cases of "military necessity."
Thus the test used by Rules 285, 286 and 288 narrows the scope of
legislation permissible under Article 43 of the Hague Convention.
Whereas "necessity" would seem the correct word for permissible
changes of the laws under Article 43, Rule 285 speaks of "security of
the invading army and its contribution to its support and efficiency
and success of its operations," Rule 286 speaks of the "exigencies of
the military service," and Rule 288 of "military necessity."
Rule 285 imposes only a duty to continue "ordinary" civil and crim-
inal laws. Hence it seems to imply that laws involving war legislation
may be abolished even though the general test for the abolishment of
existing laws is not met:13
APPLICATIONS OF ARTICLE 43 IN VARIOus FIELDS OF LAW
The application of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations might lead
to different results in different fields of law. The occupant will be
See also Article 362, iwhich provides:
"Political laws and constitutional privileges are as a matter of course sus-
pended during occupation: for instance, the laws affecting recruitment and those
concerning suffrage, the right of assembly, and the right to bear arms, and the
freedom of the press. Special orders, may, however, be necessary to make the
suspension of the laws known to the population of the occupied territory, for
example, an order forbidding able-bodied men of military age to quit the occupied
territory."
43. See Cillekens v. De Haas, Dutch Dist. Ct., Rotterdam, May 14, 1919, cited
supra note 20.
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"absolutely prevented from respecting the laws of the occupied coun-
try" in the field of public law to a greater extent than in the field of
private law since under the Rousseau-Portales doctrine war is sup-
posedly waged against sovereign and armies and not against subjects
and civilians. 4 Thus in the field of constitutional law the occupant is
totally independent of the constitution of the occupied country if the
maintenance and safety of his military forces and the purpose of war so
require.4 5 On the other hand, it has been said that, under the principle
of respecting the institutions of the occupied country, "an occupant
has no right to transform a liberal into a communist or fascist economy,
except so far as military or public-order needs should require individual
changes;" 4 that, therefore, Soviet Russia was not free to transform
the Baltic countries into Soviet republics, Germany would not be free
to transform the Norwegian economic structure into a totalitarian
system of the Nazi type,47 and the abolishment of fascism in Sicily and
the occupied provinces of Italy constituted a violation of the Hague
Regulations.4 The Hague Regulations, however, express nowhere the
principle that the occupant must blindly respect the institutions of the
occupied country. The doctrine first established by Fauchille " would
not seem to apply where a political system constitutes a permanent
threat to the maintenance and safety of the military forces of the
occupant so that there is "absolute necessity" to abolish it.
It is only natural that administrative law is affected to a greater
extent by occupation than any other field of law, for administrative
laws are usually in conflict with the interest of the occupant. 9 Accord-
44. See notes 34 and 35 supra.
45. See 2 OPPENHEII, op. cit. supra note 7, § 169, pp. 349-50.
46. FEILCHENFELD, op. cit. supra note 2, § 331, p. 90; 4 BUSTMXANTE, DERECHo INTEr-
NACIONA. P6nLICO (1937) § 1067, p. 3 2 4 .
47. FEILCHENFELD, op. cit. supra note 2, § 331, p. 90; see also id. at § 327, p. 89.
48. Davidonis, supra note 9, at 467.
49. 2 FAuCHILLE, TRarrA DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (Paris, 1921), § 1166(1),
p. 228 where it is said: "Comme la situation de l'occupant est 6minemment provioire, il ne
doit pas bouleverser les institutions du pays." See also FEILC1IENFELD, op. cit. supra note 2,
§§ 326-31, pp. 89-90; Davidonis, supra note 9, at467.
Fauchille cites two instances: (1) Division of Belgium into two administrative districts
by German decree of March 21, 1917. See also 2 G.RNER, op. cit. supra note 7, § 372, p. 79;
2 OppE r, op. cit. supra note 7, § 169, p. 349; 10 HUBERICH AND NICOL-SrEYER (CdO.),
German Legislation for the Occupied Territories of Belgium (Official Tets) (1917) 201-2.
de Visscher, La siparation administrati e dcrtt& en Bdgique par l'antoritg allerande (1918)
25 RnvuE GA.ARALE DE DROIT IN TERNATIONAL PUBLIC 92; FEILCHENFELD, Op. cit. Stufra
note 2, § 329, p. 89. (2) Conversion of the University'of Ghent into a Flemish institution by
German decree of Dec. 31, 1915. See also 2 GARN ER, Op. Cit. supra note 7, § 371, pp. 77-8;
2 OPPE.'Emiu, op. cit. supra note 7, § 169, p. 350, n. 1; Basdevant, Laflanandisatlion par
I'Allemagne de I' UuirersitM de Gand (1917) 24 REvUE GL,&RALE DE DROI INTER;TV1o.A..L
PUBLIC 111; PASSELECQ, LA QuESTIoN FL ,ALmwE ET L'ALLEAGNE (1917). See, however,
HATScHEK, VOELKERRECHT ALS SYSTEU IEcHTLica BEDEUTSAMtER STAATrSKTE (1923) 331.
50. See 2 FAuCHILLE, op. cit. supra note 49, § 1165(2), p. 226; 4 Bcs,%A.uTE, op. cit.
supra note 46, § 1068, p. 3 2 6 .
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ingly, the occupant will immediately suspend the laws concerning
(1) press, (2) assembly, (3) bearing arms and ammunition, (4) right of
suffrage, (5) right to quit or travel freely, and (6) recruiting in occupied
territory." Thus, when the American Expeditionary Forces moved
into the Rhineland in 1918, Memorandum No. 4, the first specific
regulation issued by the American Army for observance by the German
civil population, 2 dealt with the sale and bearing of deadly weapons
and ammunition, the right of assembly, the sale and use of alcohol,
billeting and requisitions. After the occupation was carried out, special
orders were issued concerning identification and circulation,"3 deliver-
ing and carrying of arms and deadly weapons and ammunition," sale or
gift of alcoholic drinks,55 assemblies and meetings, 0 publications, 7
post, -telegraph and telephone,55 pigeons, 59 and photographs." H1ow-
ever, it would seem that the occupant cannot suspend customs duties. 1
The civil officials of the occupied country are not bound to continue
in service. 2 On the other hand, if they do so continue, the occupant is
not bound to retain them.63 Undoubtedly the occupant cannot require
an oath of allegiance from them, since they remain citizens of the occu-
pied country,"4 but he can require an oath of obedience.66 Although
51. See 2 HYDE, op. cit. supra note 8, § 690, p. 367; 2 FAUCHILLE, op. cit, satra note 49,
§ 1165(2), p. 226.
52. AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF OCCUPIED GERMANY: 1918-1920, REPORT
OF THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS (1943) 32-40.
53. Id. at 105-7.
54. Id. at 107-10.
55. Id. at 110-3.
56. Id. at 113-5.
57. Id. at 115-6.
58. Id. at 116-7.
59. rd. at 117-8.
60. Id. at 118.
61. See 2 FAUCHILLE, op. cit. supra note 49, § 1165(2), p. 227. A German decree of
Jan. 3, 1915 provided that the Belgian custom laws should apply to the French territories of
Givet-Fumey which were controlled by the German Governor-General established in
Belgium.
62. Colby, Occupation under the Laws of War (1926) 26 COL. L. REv. 146, 152; BIRx.
RIMER, MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW (3d ed. 1914) 68.
63. 2 OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 7, pp. 349-50; Colby, supra note 62, at 152-3. See
also U. S. WAR DEP'T, op. cit. supra note 41, Rule 311.
64. 2 FAUCEILLE, op. cit. supra note 49, § 1174, p. 240; STRUPP, Op. cit. supra note 19,
at 102. See also U. S. WAR DEP'T, op. cit. supra note 41, Rule 298.
65. SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND (1911) 366; 2 MEURER, Op. cit. supra note 12, at
241; STRUPP, op. cit. supra note 19, at 102. See also U. S. WAR DEP'T, op. cit. supra note 41,
Rule 309. But see the French MANUEL X L'USAGE DES OFFICIERS; (1898) 5 REVUE GANw-
ARALE DE DROJT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 803.
The Germans in their Belgian occupation of 1914-1918 required the retained Belgian
officials to make the following declaration of loyalty: "I hereby promise to continue to
administer my office conscientiously and loyally, in accordance with the Hague Convention
of October 18, 1907, and not to perform or omit any acts which would be harmful to the
German administration in the occupied Belgian territories."
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civil officials remain subject to the disciplinary laws of the occupied
country in the event they violate their duties, it would seem that a
violation which is harmful or injurious to the occupant may also be
dealt with under the laws of waryG
It is the general rule that the organization of the courts of the occu-
pied country should remain intactY67 However, special tribunals may
be established in the following instances: (1) to deal with offenses by
citizens of the occupied territory against the authority of the occupying
forces or against persons belonging to the armed forces of the occupant
or in violation of regulations issued by the occupant; c3 (2) to replace
the regular courts if the local administration of justice is completely
disorganized; 11 and (3) to deal with members of the military forces of
the occupant. 0 If the political system of the occupied country con-
66. See U.S. NVAR DEP'T, op. cit. supra note 41, Rule 312:
"Punishment of ciril officials.-Acts of civil officers that are harmful or in-
jurious to the occupant Will be dealt with under the laws of war. Other wrongs or
crimes committed by them Will be punished according to the law of the land."
67. 2 FAUcHILLE, op. cit. supra note 49, § 1168, p. 2 3 2 .
In Belgium by German ordinance of Feb. 3, 1915, provision was made for the creation of
special tribunals in each province to determine the amount of damage for which munici-
palities were held responsible in case of violence, theft, and outbreak on the part of the
inhabitants.
By another German decree of Feb. 10, 1915, provision was made for the creation of a
new set of special tribunals to decide disputes between landlords and tenants.
As to the recognition of these courts, se 2 GA.R'ER, op. cit. supra note 7, § 374, p. 83;
2 HUBERICH AND NICOL-SPEYER, op. cit. supra note 49, at 57-9; (1917) 44 JoURNAL Du
DROIT INTERNATIONAL (Clunet) 1003; (1915) 42 id. at 288.
On the practice of the Italians occupying Austrian territory cee GEMI,, APU.UTI DI
DIRIro INTERNAZiONALE (1923) 355.
68. 2 GARNER, op. cit. supra note 7, § 375, p. 85; 2 FArcHILLE, op. cit. supra note 49,
§ 1170, p. 237; BIRKEHIER, op. cit. supra note 62, at 38, 47; 1 WXNTHOP, MILITARY LIW
(1886) 961; 4 BUSTAmENTE, op. cit. supra note 46, § 1070, pp. 338-9.
In practice, military occupants have usually acted in accordance with this theory.
During the war between the United States and Mexico (1846-1848), General Scott
organized special tribunals called "Military Commissions." Similar tribunals were or-
ganized by the federal authorities in the Southern States during the Civil War. During
World War I, provost courts, military commissions, and a court for vagrants and juveniles
were established in the Rhineland.
69. Such special courts were organized (a) by Lord Roberts in Transvaal in 1900;
(b) by France in the German colony of Cameroon in 1916 and 1917 (decrees of May 6, 1916,
and Jan. 12, 1917); (c) by France in Alsace-Lorraine in 1914, when the German judges had
fled; and (d) by Germany in Belgium in 1914 after the Eo-called "judges' strike." See
2 GARNER, op. cit. supra note 7, § 378, p. 91; 2 FAUCHILLE, op. cit. supra note 49, § 1169,
p. 232; 2 OPPrNa n, op. cit. supra note 7, § 172, p. 387, n. 2; Colby, supra note 62, at 159;
GLENN, THE ARmy AND THE LAw (1918) 90-7; 4 Busmr.NTE, op. cit. supra note 40,
§ 1071, p. 340.
70. 7 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1906) 257 et seq.; VALERY, DROlT
INTERNATIONAL PRIVk (1914) 101; 2 v. BAR, LEHRBUCFI DES INTERNATIONALE\ PRxVAT-
RECHTS (1892) 350; HOLKEN, DIE OKKUPATIONSARMEE UND DAS RECIHT U nESE=TN
GEBIET (1917) 31, 42; Contra: FRiscH, DER VOELKERRECHTLICIIE BEGRIFF DER ExT-Frn-
RIXTORIALITAET (1917) 47.
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stitutes a threat to the security of the occupant's army, it seems that as
a matter of military necessity the occupant is entitled to destroy those
courts which are closely connected with that system. Thus there is
little doubt that the Allies should be entitled under Section 43 to
abolish the German People's Court, an institution designed to impose
severe penalties upon those who committed major political crimes. In
addition, they are authorized to deprive German courts of the jurisdic-
tion to deal with minor political crimes given to them by the Nazi
Government.
While the occupant has a right to remove judges,' those judges who
remain have the right not to be interfered with by. the occupant in
passing judgments,7 2 and they cannot be compelled to pronbunce
judgments in the name of the occupant.7 On the other hand, the
occupant need not allow them to render their verdicts in the name of
the legitimate government.74
It is an established general principle that the local ciil and criminal
law should be respected by the occupant.75 However, necessity created
either by the occupied country's interest in the restoration of public
order and civil life or by the occupant's military interest may justify a
great number of changes. 76 During the occupation of the Rhineland
at the end of the first World War, the proclamation of Marshal Foch as
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces declared that the "laws and
regulations in force at the moment of occupation will be continued in
so far asthey do not affect our rights or our safety." 7 At the same time
General John J. Pershing, as Commander-in-Chief of the American
71. 2 GARNER, op. cit. supra note 7, § 373, p. 81; 2 OPPENIEIM, op. cil. supra note 7,
§ 172, p. 349.
As to the removal of Jewish judges by the Russians during their occupation of Lemberg
in the World War, see Cybichowski, Die Besetizung Lembergs im Kriege 1914-15 (1916) 26
ZEITSCnRIFT FUER INTERNATIONALES RECHT (Niemeyers) 427, 452.
72. 2 OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 7, § 172, p. 349; 4 BUSTAMANTE, op. cit. suspra
note 46, § 1071, p. 3 4 1 .
73. 2 OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 7, § 172, p. 349; 2 FAUCHILLE, op. cit. supra note 49,
§ 1169, p. 232. See also Stauffenberg, supra note 7, at 104; 2 GUELLE, PRA.CIS DEs LOIS Dn LA
GUERRE (1884) 18; 7 PRADIER-FODPRA, TRAITA DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1897)
821; 1 MIRIGNHAC AND LAMONON, LE DROIT DES GENS ET LA GUERRE DE 1914-1918 (1921)
355;4 BUSTAMANTE, op. cit. supra note 46, § 1071, p. 341.
74. 2 OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 7, § 172, p. 349; Cybichowski, supra note 71, at
448; WUNDERLICH, DER BELGISCHE JUSTIZSTREIK (1930) 49.
75. 2 GARNER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 85; 2 FAUCHILLE, op. cit. supra note 49, § 1166,
pp. 227-8. 4 BUSTAMANTE, op. cit. supra note 46, § 1069, p. 336.
76. At the conference of Brussels, session of Aug. 12, 1874, Colonel Count Lanza
voiced the opinion that civil and penal laws which have not a political character would re-
main in force under the draft of Article 3 of the Declaration of Brussels. AcrEs DE LA CON-
FERENCE DE BRUXELLES DE 1874 (Brussels, 1899), 135-6; 4 MARTENS, NOUVEAU RECUEIL
GANARAL DE TRAITAS (2d ser.) (1879) 77.
77. AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF OCCUPIED GERMANY, op. Cit. supra note 52,
at 30.
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Expeditionary Forces, declared in his proclamation to the inhabitants
of the area occupied by the American Forces that "the existing laws
and regulations, in so far as they do not interfere with the duty and the
security of the American troops, shall remain in force." 78
During the occupation of Belgium in 1914-1918, Germany pro-
mulgated a large number of new laws affecting trade, education,
health, language, business, and ordinary industrial pursuits such as
agriculture, stock-breeding, slaughtering of livestock for food, muzzling
of dogs, feeding of animals, planting and harvesting of crops, the sale of
produce, the tanning of hides, and the conservation of foods.7 Whether
all these regulations were justified by necessity, either in the interest
of the population or in the military interest of Germany, has been
doubted.sO
In this war it would seem that Article 43 permits the Allies to change
the civil and criminal laws in those instances in which the change is
justified by necessity either in the interest of the population or in the
military interest of the Allies. Since the Nazi system constitutes a
threat to the security of the occupant's army, the occupant vill con-
sider it an absolute necessity to change all civil and criminal laws
and provisions which reflect Nazi ideology. Thus it would seem that
all civil and criminal laws and provisions could be abolished which
express racial, religious, or political discrimination. 1 In addition,
non-discriminatory laws emanating from racial fanaticism could be
abrogated under the rule of necessity.82 A more complicated questiort
78. Id. at 31-2.
79. 2 GA.NER, op. cit. supra note 7, § 376, p. 88.
80. Ibid.
81. See, e.g., "Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor" (Gnseiz
zuin Schulz des deutschen Bluies und der deutschen Ehre) of Sept. 15, 1935, REICUSGScz-
BLATr (hereinafter cited as RGBI.) 1. 1334; "Law concerning Restrictions of Testamentary
and Intestacy Rights of Persons on account of Their Conduct against the Common Interest"
(Gesetz ueer erbrecktlic7e Beschraenkungen wegen gemeinschafts widrigen VIerhaltens) of Nov.
5, 1937 (RGBI. 1. 1161); "Law concerning Change of First Names and Surnames" (Geselz
iseber die Aenderung von Familiennano; und Vornamen) of Jan. 5, 1938 (RGB1. 1.9), "Scond
Supplementary Decree" of Aug. 17, 1938 (RGBI. 1. 1044), "Third Supplementary Decree"
of Dec. 14, 1940 (RGBI. 1. 1669); "Law concerning Lease Agreements ith Jews" (Gesetr
ueber 2Mietsrerhaeltnisse mit Ju.den) of April 30, 1939 (RGBI. 1. 864).
There are also a number of statutes which contain one or several provisions dLsigned to
discriminate in political, racial, or religious respect. See, e.g., Sections 4, 20, and 2R (1) of the
"Law on Marriage and Divorce" of July 6, 1938 (RGBI. 1. 807); v-arous provisions of the
"Law concerning the Status of Persons" of Nov. 3, 1937 (RGBI. 1. 1146); Section 4 of the
"Eleventh Executory Decree Concerning Reich Citizenship" of Nov. 26, 1941 (RGBI. 1.
722).
82. "Law for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring," July 14, 1933 (RGBI.
1.529); Section 1 (d) of the "Law for the Protection of the Hereditary Health of the German
People" of Oct. 18, 1935 (RGBI. 1. 1246).
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arises where a general clause 83 has been used by German courts to
implement Nazi principles. Since previous interpretations of these
clauses by the courts do not constitute as strong precedents as they
would in Anglo-American law, no legislative action would seem neces-
sary.
Nazi war legislation has actually disrupted the German admin-
istration of justice. Thus in the field of substantive law business
contracts are no longer binding;. the judges are authorized, in effect, to
extend the time of performance, to order instalment of payments, to
modify a contract in every other way and even to cancel it." In the
field of civil procedure cases are retained on the docket only when the
trial cannot possibly be postponed,85 and the right to appeal has been
virtually abolished. Since these and other war laws do not enjoy the
protection of Article 43 they could be modified or abrogated at any
time. Whether this is a wise policy during the initial stage 80 of occupa-
tion is a different question.
CASES IN WHICH ARTICLE 43 Is INAPPLICABLE
Delegation of Power. Does the limitation of the legislative power of
the occupant imposed by Article 43 lose its force where the statutes of
the occupied country provide for broad delegation of power to ad-
ministrative officials? It could very well be argued that, since the
legislative body of the occupied country has expressly consented to the
abrogation and abolishment of law by delegation of power, the law
"of the occupied country is respected" even though it is changed by the
occupant. This conclusion would be a matter of necessity at least in
those instances in which administrative agencies of the occupied coun-
try have always exercised quasi-legislative functions which, after occu-
pation, might be carried out by members of the military government.
83. See Sections 133, 138, 157, 242, and 826 of the German Civil Code; see also Section
48 (2) of the "Law Concerning the Making of Wills and Agreements of Inheritance" of
July 31, 1938 (RGB1. 1. 973) and Sections 12-21 of the "Act Amending the Law of Family
Relations," April 12, 1938 (RGBI. 1. 380).
As to cases interpreting the aforementioned sections in the "Nazi spirit," see Adami,
Das Program der N.S.D.A.P. und die Rechtsprechung (1939) 9 DEUTSCHES RrCuT (A) 498,
See also Jenne, Volksverbundene Rechtsprechung (1936) 1 DEUTSCHE RiECnTSPFLEGIU (1936)
166; Dickman, Outline of Nazi Civil Law (1943) 15 Miss. L. J. 127-34; Note, The Place of
Law in Germany (1943) 59 L. Q. REv. 140.
84. See decree of Nov. 30, 1939, Verordnung veber Verlragshilfe des Richlter aus Anlass
des Krieges (RGU31. 1. 2329); see also decrees of April 20, 1940 (RGBI. 1. 671) and Dec. 11,
1942 (RGBI. 1. 706).
85. Decree concerning war measures in the field of civil procedure of May 12, 1943
(RGBI. 1. 290). See also decree concerning the saving of personnel in criminal matters,
May 29, 1943 (RGBI. 1.346).
86. See Zweite Kriegsmassnahmenverordnung of Sept. 27, 1944 (RGBI. 1. 229). As a
result, all courts of appeal (Oberlandesgerichte) including the Kammergericht have been
eliminated.
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Waiver. Whether the limitation contained in Article 43 can be
waived by the sovereign of the occupied country is part of the broader
issue of whether the provisions of the Hague Convention on land
warfare can be altered by an agreement of the belligerent parties. It
might be contended that, since the provisions of the Hague Convention
are terms of an agreement, they can be changed by the partiesY.' How-
ever, aside from the possibility that all parties to the Hague Conven-
tion must consent to its modification, these provisions might be con-
sidered merely a restatement of unwritten law. Hence, the final ansver
must depend on whether the provisions of the Hague Convention are
to be considered ius dispositivum or ius cogens. That they constitute
ius dispositivum has been most ardently urged by Strupp in discussing
the validity of the German-Allied armistice of November 11, 1918:
"If . .. numerous so-called violations of the law of nations
in this war have never been committed either for lack of factual
evidence or in the absence of pertinent law, it is extremely regretta-
ble that even lawyers have attempted to consider the armistice
provisions as being inconsistent -ith the law of nations. For they
have overlooked the fact mentioned in connection with another
subject matter that, assuming an inconsistency between the
armistice provisions and either the written or customary law of
nations, each of its principles may be altered by agreement due to
the derogatory nature of the law of nations. And as the doctrine
'dura lex, sed lex' is an established principle of domestic law, the
corresponding principle of 'dura conventio, sed conventio' must be
also true in the field of the law of nations." ss
But Strupp's premise is rather doubtful, since a "dura conventio" may
very well be invalid if it violates a principle of the law of contracts
which cannot be waived, such as "public policy" or the "statute of
frauds." It is submitted that no general doctrine can be laid dom and
that those principles of the law of nations which constitute the mini-
mum requirement for civilized warfare cannot be waived, whereas
others may be. Under this theory, the principle embodied in Article 43
would seem to be subject to abrogation.
In practice, Article 43 has been waived. Thus, by virtue of Articles 3
87. FEILCHENFELD, op. cit. supra note 2, § 407, p. 114, takes the po2ition that modern
international law does not restrict the validity of armistice stipulations which provide for
harsher treatment than that permitted under the Hague Regulations. He says: "There is no
evidence in State practice that such restrictive rules have become a part of international
law." See also Davidonis, supra note 9, at 467.
The term "unconditional surrender" as used in the Declaration of MAocov.-, Oct. 30,
1943, means complete surrender of all armed forces and the opening of all the enemy's
territory to military occupation.
88. Strupp, Das Waffenstillstanilsabkornenromtn 11. Norember 1918 (1919) ZEscn=nn-
FUER VOELKERREcHT 252, 257; see also HEYLAND, DiE REcrrrssTr-LLU G DER nFTznrx
RmEINLAN DE (1923) 66-9; FEMCHENFELD, op. cit. supra note 2, § 407, p. 114.
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and 5 of the Rhineland Convention of 1919, the inter-Allied high com-
mand issued a regulation requiring the registration of German statutes
and regulations which were in effect prior to the occupation as a pre-
requisite of their validity in the Rhineland. While the German courts
declared this regulation invalid, they did so, not because it violated
Article 43, but because, under their construction, Articles 3 and 5 of the
Rhineland Convention did not authorize the inter-Allied high com-
mand to issue such a regulation.89
Unconstitutional Laws. Article 43 would also seem inapplicable if
the laws of the occupied country are invalid under its own constitution
as it existed at the time they were enacted. When the invalidity of
laws has been determined within the occupied country, this principle
governs beyond peradventure. Where, however, invalidity has not been
so established, the question arises .whether the occupant may pass
judgment on constitutionality. In those occupied countries in which
domestic courts or special agencies are authorized to invalidate laws,
the occupant must respect this practice as part of the domestic laws
of the occupied country in accordance with Article 43. But if no such
special procedure is provided for the invalidation of laws, there seems
to be no reason why the occupant should not pass on their validity. 0
89. See Reichsfinanzhof (German Tax Court), Dec. 7, 1926 [1926] 2 Die Rechtspre-
chung des Reichsfinanzhofs in Leitsaetzen 68, reprinted in (1927) 56 JuRISIsdur WOCIiE-
SCHRIFT 2330. Reichsgericht (German Supreme Court), Sept. 22, 1922, 105 Entscheidungen
des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 179, 18t, and March 7, 1922, 56 Entscheidungen des
Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen 288,289.
90. American courts have in general declined to review the validity of acts carried out
by public officers of foreign countries.
In regard to civil officials of foreign countries, see Earn Line S.S. Co. v. Sutherland SS.
Co., 254 Fed. 126, 129 (S. D. N. Y. 1918), afd sub nom. The Claveresk, 264 Fed. 276
(C. C. A., 2d, 1920); Hewitt v. Speyer, 250 Fed. 367 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918); Banco de Espana v.
Federal Reserve Bank" 114 F. (2d) 438, 443 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940); cf. The Navemar, 102 F.
(2d) 444 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
In regard to military officials of foreign countries, see Union Shipping & Trading Co. v.
United States, 127 F. (2d) 771, 774 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S.
250 (1897); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297 (1918); Ricaud v. American Metal
Co., 246 U. S. 304 (1918). Contra: Government of Kingdom of Belgium v. The Lubrafol,
43 F. Supp. 403 (E. D. Tex. 1941); Fields v. Predionica I Tkanica A. D., 35 N. Y. S. (2d)
408 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
However, in regard to the validity of foreign statutes under foreign constitutional law,
the position of the courts seems to be different. Thus, in Canada Southern Ry. v. Gebhard,
109 U. S. 527 (1883), the Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the constitutionality
of a Canadian act under Canadian constitutional law. See also Sabariego v. Maverick, 124
U. S. 261 (1888) and Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U. S. 468 (1937), where the Supreme Court
passed on the validity of Mexican acts under Mexican law.
In the field of conflict of laws it also seems that courts may review the constitutionality
of a foreign statute under the respective foreign constitutional law, if the domestic courts of
the foreign country are permitted to do so. Ct. of App., Paris, June 13, 1928, and Ct. of
App., Bordeaux, Jan. 2, 1928, [1928] REcUEIL GkNARALE DES Lois BT DES ARREPTS (Sirey)
2. 161; see also decision of a lower Austrian court reported in (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1031.
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ULTRA ViREs LEGISLATION AND EXTRATERRITORLIAL EFFECT
Many courts have assumed the right to examine whether the occu-
pant's measures comply with Article 43.91 The wisdom of these deci-
NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL. L.tw (1943) 258; Niboyet, Qt'est.ce
gue ta loi tranggre aLx yeu, des juges d'un pays dtrminm (1928) 9 REYLTE Dc DROIT INTEr-
NATIONAL (3d series) 753, 764-72; Nussbaum, Problem of Prizing Foreign Law (1941) 50
YALE L. J. 1031; Note, Protective Expropriatory Decrees of Governments in F_xilc (1941) 41
COL. L. REv. 1072.
91. Reviewing the question whether the occupant's legislative action complied with
Article 43, Hague Regulations, these legislative acts were held to be valid in the following
cases:
Cillekens v. De Haas, Dutch Dist. Ct., Rotterdam, May 14, 1919, discussed supra,
p. 000, where the decision of the court was based on the theory that Article 43 applies only
to ordinary laws, but not to war measures. In addition, the court said: "Even if that were
otherwise, it would in any case be in the interest of public order and safety to restrict the
moratorium to the shortest possible term. At the moment of the repeal of the moratorium
it was impossible to foresee the end of the occupation of the larger part of Belgium, so that
it might have been desirable not to wait till the end of the war to terminate the moratorium.
Consequently, this measure may be considered to have served the re-establishment and
insurance of public order and safety in Belgium, and be considered as lawful." WAXuL'us
AD LAuTERPAcHT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 471. See to the same effect, OQsterrieth & Co. v.
Emile Dierck, Dist. Ct., Breda, May 22, 1917, [1917] NEDERLDSCIIC JURIS1'RUDENTIC 594,
(1917) 2 Ivr. L. NOTES 127; Elias v. Bak, Dist. Ct., Haarlem, Oct. 9, 1917, [19171 Nro rn-
LANDSC=- JURISPRUDENTLE 1079.
In Bochart v. Committee of Supplies of Corneux, Belgian Ct. of App., Liege, Feb. 28,
1920, WILLm-s AND LAUTERPACHT, op. cit. supra note 3, No. 327, p. 462, an order of Aug. 8,
1918 of the German Governor-General in Belgium declared void all purchases of vegetables
not yet gathered. The appellant sued for the specific performance of such a contract, aszert-
ing the illegality of the German order for the reason that it sought to benefit the occupant
rather than the occupied country. The order was held to be valid. The court said: "In fact,
the occupying Power, even if it may have contemplated the possibility of a personal profit
for its own nationals, nevertheless took its action with a view to regulating and diminishing
the exorbitant price of vegetables. It acted in the place of the legitimate authority which
for the time being had been ousted, and in conformity with the provisions of Article 43 of
the Hague Convention." ]bid.
In City of Malines v. Socit6 Centrale pour l'Exploitation du Gaz, Belgian Ct. of App.,
Brussels, July 25, 1925, reported in McN.uR ,AD L.UTERPACHIT (eds.), ANNUAL DiGFST oF
PUBLIC I.-rrENATioNAL LAw CAsEs: 1925-1926 (1929), No. 362, p. 475, an appeal was
brought against the decision in favor of a company which claimed certain sums from the
City of Malines corresponding to the increase of the cost of supplying gas, the increase being
due partly to the measures taken- during the war by the occupying authorities. The City
maintained against the claim that the decrees of the occupying authority were invalid. The
Court of Appeals affirmed, saying that "the circumstances of war-time, and particularly the
increase in the cost of raw materials and the necessity for providing for the needs of the
population, in fact justified the measures taken by the occupying authorities; that on this
ground these measures come within the scope of the administrative acts permitted to the
occupying Power by the Hague Convention No. IV (Article 43 of Annexed Regulations)
with a view to the maintenance or reestablishment of order and safety; and that conse-
quently the decree in question must be regarded as applicable." Ibid.
See also similar decisions by Court of Appeals of Li ge, June 4,1919, [191912 PAsicxustE
BELGE 137; June 25,1919, [1920] 2 id. at 208; Feb. 21, 1920, [1920] 2 id. at 112.
The legislative acts of the occupant have been held to be invalid in the following cases:
19451
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
sions is doubtful. While such a review would constitute a convenient
check on ultra vires legislation, it seems questionable whether the Hague
Convention intended to sanction reviewability of the measures taken
by the military occupant.9 2 It is difficult to assume that ordinary
judges, and sometimes justices of the peace or their substitutes, are in a
position to determine whether a law was necessary or not. 3 It is there-
Ville d'Anvers v. 9tat allemand, German-Belgian Mixed Artibral Tribunal, Oct. 19,
1925, (1925) 5 RECUEIL DES D.CISIONS DES TRIBUNAUX ARBITRAUX MIXTES 712, 6 HAC-
WORTH, op. cit. supra, at 395-6. The City of Antwerp made claim against the German
Government for the amount of sentences pronounced against it by an arbitral tribunal
established by a German decree of February 3, 1915, and modifying a former Belgian decree
of the "Ten Vendbmiaire, Year IV." The German-Belgian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal recog-
nized the responsibility of the German Government to compensate the City of Antwerp in
respect to these sentences. It said: "Article 43 provides that 'the authority of the legitimate
power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the
measures in his power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.' The respect for the
Belgian laws was therefore for the occupant a duty which ceased only in case of being 'abso-
lutely prevented.' It is quite obvious that there was no military motive which could have
justified the abrogation of said decree, i.e., the deprivation of the Belgian tribunals, of its
jurisdiction, and the creation of arbitral tribunals. Even if one would construe Article 43 to
the effect that the occupant may modify the existing laws whenever it appears necessary for
the maintenance of public order, maintenance of public order did not require the creation of
such an exceptional jurisdiction. The Belgian tribunals which had jurisdiction functioned
normally . . . ." (Translation by author.)
In re X, French Ct. of App., Nancy, Jan. 8, 1920, (1920) 47 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL (Clunet) 213; WILLIAMS AND LAUTERPACHT, op. cit. supra note 3, No. 334, p. 468 ; 6
HAcKwxTH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 397. The judges of the court of first instances of Briey
and Congry remained at their posts at the beginning of the German Occupation. The
German authorities subsequently relieved them of their functions and replaced them by a
court established in the name of the German Empire on June 14, 1917. A woman charged
with infanticide was acquitted by a decision of this court. When she was prosecuted anew
for the same facts by a French court she pleaded double jeopardy. It was held that tle
defense of double jeopardy did not lie: "The decision . . . of the Court created by the
German authority could not produce any effect, direct or indirect, in France. . . . Article 43
of the Hague Convention in no way authorized the occupying authorities to suppress in the
occupied regions French courts which, so far from disturbing public order, safeguarded it.
Moreover, the crime of infanticide is not among those reserved in principle by the law or
war to the cognizance of the enemy as being likely to jeopardise the security of his army."
WILLIAMS AND LAUTERPACHT, supra, at 469.
In De Brabant and Gosselin v. T. and A. Florent, Belgian Ct. of App., Brussels, July 22,
1920, WILLIAMS AND LAUTERPACHT, supra, No. 328, p. 463, the facts were the same as in the,
case of Bochart v. Committee of Supplies of Corneux, supra. However, the court held the.
German order invalid: ". . . the German Order . . . was not made with a view to assuring
public order and security, but to starving the population. It went beyond the powers given
to the occupant by Article 43 of the Hague Convention; it never had the force of law and
cannot therefore avoid an agreement properly concluded by the parties." Ibid.
92. See MEURER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 22: "Of course, as stated by v. Martens at the-
Hague Convention, the occupant himself is entitled to determine whether a case of necessity
exists, and his determination is not subject to review." (Translation by author.)
93. See Leurquin, supra note 25, at 56: "It is certain that the check upon such legisla-
tion presented by the judiciary of a country such as Belgium would constitute a guaranty for
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fore not astonishing that the Belgian and German Supreme Courts
have denied the power of the courts to review measures of the occupant
under Article 43.94
the people, and this guaranty, if it results from the intention of the contracting States them-
selves, should be loyally respected by the occupant. It appears very doubtful, however,
whether the Hague Convention meant to Sanction this. It is difficult to assume that ordinary
judges and sometimes justices of the peace or their substitutes are in a position to decide
whether a law was necessary."
94. See 2 GARNER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 83, n. 1, referring to 2 NVsmAirm, Inr-
NATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1913) 97. C.f. FEILCHENFELD, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 493-9. p 143.
In a decision of the Court of Cassation of Belgium, May 13, 1916, (1916) 1 Irm. L.
NoTEs 136, 133 the court refused to review whether a German decree complied with the
limitations expressed in Article 43,
"... which it is true, imposes upon the occupant the strict obligation of tat:-
ing the aforesaid measures, also prescribes the various methods which the occupant
is to observe in carrying out his task: (1) he is to do that which rests with him;
(2) he is to act in so far as possible; (3) he must have respect, on taking these
measures, for the laws of the countr, and shall not depart therefrom unless it be
absolutely necessary;
"But whereas the difficulties with regard to the alleged non-compliance with
some of the aforesaid methods and the manner in which the occupant has dis-
charged his duty merely concern international relations, and their solution can
only lead to the application of the Sanction as set out by Article 3 of the Conven-
tion;
"That if they attempted to solve these difficulties, the judicial authorities of
the occupied territory would encroach upon the prerogative of the competent
national power, that they must therefore abstain from doing so under pain of acting
ultra vires."
A German decision of the German Supreme Court, rendered Oct. 24, 1920, and reported
in BRUNs, FoNTrEs Jutls GENTiu,,, Ser. A, § 2, vol. 1 (1931) No. 205, p. S75, involves the
question whether the accused had violated a German war decree of April 18, 1917, pro-
hibiting the export of silver in the Rhineland, where the decree has been suspended by the
Inter-Allied Commission. The German Supreme Court held that the suspension of the
decree by the Allied commission was valid: "At the time of occupying German territory, the
Allies assumed exercise of the entire government in it. Government also includes legilative
power. Accordingto Article 43, Hague Regulations of October 18, 1907 (RGBI. 1910, p. 147),
the military authorities,-that is, according to Article 3 of the agreement concerning occupa-
tion of the Rhineland of June 28, 1919 (RGBI. 1919, p. 1339), the High Inter-Allied Com-
mission-had jurisdiction to exercise the legislative power. The aforementioned provisions
also defines the scope of legislative power. If the limits laid down by them should be trans-
gressed, there would be a breach of an international agreement. The legal consequences of
such a breach must be determined by the law of nations. The courts of the occupied territory
are not in a position to determine whether the Allies in exercising legislative power in the
occupied territory exceeded their power; for instance, whether a cogent obstacle (empl^tzhe-
ment absolu) existed within the meaning of Article 43, which prevented them from respzct-
ing the laws of the occupied country." (Translation by author.)
See also decision of the German Supreme Court of June 7, 1921, 102 Entscheidungen des
Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 2S5, 256, where the question was left open.
On the other hand, the German Reichs Tax Court (Reichsfinanzhof) as well as the
German Supreme Court have held that, where an international agreement such as that con-
cerning the occupation of the Rhineland of June 28, 1919, has been transformed into munic-
ipal law by passing it as an act of the legislative body, the municipal courts of the occupied
19451
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Most courts refuse to give extraterritorial effect to measures taken
by the military occupant.95 Whether such refusals constitute valid
precedents governing extraterritorial effect of legislative measures
seems doubtful since the cases in which they were made involved
administrative acts, such as the sequestration of property, rather than
legislation. In so far as purely legislative measures have been tested
in controversies before courts of neutral countries, they have been
recognized. Foreign exchange regulations issued by the German occu-
pant in Czechoslovakia, Austria and Holland have been recognized in
other countries, 9 and in Cillekens v. De Haas 91 a legislative measure of
a military occupant extending a moratorium was recognized by a court
of a neutral country. As a result it would seem that legislative measures
of the occupant should be given extraterritorial effect. A fuller answer
on this, as well as on other problems in the field, must await further
developments on the European continent.
country are permitted to review the scope of authority which the agreement confers upon
the occupant or his agencies (so-called theory of transformation). See cases cited supra
note 89. See also VOGELs, DAS RBEINLANDABKOMMEN (1920) 44; Luettger, Das Pruefulngs.
recht des deutschen Richters gegenueber den Verordmmngen der Rheinlandkomrission (1924)
53 JURISTIsCEE WOCHENSCHRIFT '1349; Luettgen, Zuim Recht des besetzen Gebiets (1925) 54
id. at 19; Klafisch, Die Gesetzgebung im beseisten Gebiet (1924) 53 id. at 1687; Neubert, Die
Gesetzgebung im besetzten Gebiete (1925) 54 id. at 458; Schaetzel, Der Friedensvertrag als
Reichsgesetz (1920) 25 DEUTSCHE JURXSTENZEITUNG 196.
95. Extraterritorial effect has been. denied in Soci~t6 de Sosnowice v. Banque do
Dbp6ts et de Credit, Swiss Trib. 1st inst., Geneva, Oct. 30,1917, (1918) 14 REVuE DE DuoIT
INTERNATIONAL PRIVA 190; Comptoir d'Escompte v. S. A. Charbonnages Sosnowice, Swiss
Trib. F~dfral (Sup. Ct.), Nov. 22, 1920, (1921) 43 LA SEXMAINE JUDICIAIRE 81; S. Papadoulog
of Pra (Constantinople) v. (1) N. V. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Stoombootmaatschappil
of Amsterdam, (2) J. W. Whittall & Co., Ltd., of Constantinople, Dutch Dist. Ct,, Amster-
dam, April 17, 1925, McNAIR AND LAUTERPACHT, op. cit. supra note 91, No. 19, p. 27; Rus-
sian Trade Delegation v. Soci~t6 Frangaise Industrielle et Commerciale des Ptroles (Groupo
Malopolska), French Trib. Civ., Seine, Jan. 12, 1940, (1940) 17 RECUEIL HEDDOmADAIRE DE
JURISPRUDENCE (Dalloz) 68, LAUTERPACHT (ed.), ANNUAL DIGEST AND REPORTS Or PUInLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES: 1938-1940 (1942) No. 83, p. 245. Amstelbank, N. V. v. Guar-
anty Trust Co. of New York, 177 Misc. 548, 552, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 194, 199 (1st Dep't 1941) -
Koninklijke Lederfabriek "Oisterwijk" N. V. v. Chase Nat. Bank of City of New York, 30
N. Y. S. (2d) 518 (Sup. Ct. 1941). Cf. Bank of Ethiopia v. National Bank of Egypt and
Ligouri, [1937] 1 Ch. 513, where an Italian occupation measure in Ethiopia was recognized,
On the effect of occupation measures other than legislative acts, see Niboyet, De 'efet,
en pays neutre des mesures de guerre (1920) 16 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRMVL, ET Dr.
DROIT PANAL INTERNATIONAL 248; Wright, The British Courts and Ethiopian Recognition
(1937) 31 AM. J. INT. L. 683.
96. They were recognized in Anglo-Czechoslovsk Bank v. Janssen (1944) 17 Ausr. L, J
330; Werfel v. Zivnostenska Banka, 287 N. Y. 91 (1941), 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 1001 (1st Dep't
1940); Johnson v. Briggs, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 60 (N. Y. City Ct. 1939). Extraterritorial effect
was denied in Sabl v. Laenderbank Wien Aktiengesellschaft, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 608 (Sup. Ct.
1941).
97. Cillekens v. DeHaas, Dutch Dist. Ct., Rotterdam, May 14, 1919, cited supro.
note 20.
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CONCLUSION
Even though the legislative power of the military occupant is theo-
retically limited, practically it includes jurisdiction over the entire
civilian life of the enemy population if the occupation extends over a
considerable period of time. As a result, in the present war situation
AMG (the American Military Government) is faced not only with the
task of supervising the administration and judiciary of the enemy
country, but also with the job of abolishing existing and enacting new
laws and decrees. The denazification of the German legal system will
have priority. In addition AMG will have to establish an appropriate
machinery for the distribution of food and the allocation of raw mate-
rials, because food and raw materials will be scarce. Their efficient
distribution is necessary for the restoration of public order and civilian
life, and such a restoration seems in turn a condictio sine qua non for
the accomplishment of allied war aims. This task of distribution vill
be all the more difficult, since there will be no central government to
deal with, as in 1918. Thus AMG will be confronted with the problem
of whether to use the existing control agencies 1S or to establish new
98. Under the present German economic control system two kinds of control agencies
have been established, one under the Minister of Economic Affairs (Rciehwirlsca4f1srin-
ister) and another under the Minister of Armament and War Production (Minisfr fuer
Ruestung and Kriegsproduklion). Even before the outbreak of the war the Minister of
Economic Affairs established numerous "War Production Boards" (Rciclssleckn) for the
control of various spheres of the German economy, namely, for (1) fodder, grain and other
agricultural products, (2) animals and animal products, (3) fish, (4) fats and eggs, (5) Eeed,
(6) garden-and.vineyard products, (7) forests and timbers, (8) paper, (9) wrapping mate-
rials, (10) wood construction, (11) stone and earth, (12) glass, ceramics and wood-prome- ing,
(13) potash and salt, (14) coal, (15) iron and metals, (16) technical products, (17) production
of machinery, (18) electrical products, (19) precision and optical instruments, (20) textiles,
(21) clothing and related goods, (22) furs, (23) leather, (24) rubber, (25) chemicals, (26) in-
dustrials fats and cleansing materials, (27) fuel, (28) tobacco and coffee, (29) prcdous
metals. In addition, he set up a "War Production Board" (Rcichssl) for miscellaneous
commodities. As these "War Production Boards" were not able to deal directly with all the
manufacturers and dealers, they delegated all or some of their functions to other agencies
such as Economic Control Offices (Bewirtschaflungsstdlen) and Quotaholders (KortingEc-
straeger). At the same time the Minister of Armament and War Production created for the
control of the armament industry proper (Engere Ruestungsindustrie) Main Committees
(Hauptausschuesse), Main Rings (Hauptringe), Special Committees (Sondcraussdcuessc),
Special Rings (Sonderringe), Working Committees (Arbiitsausschvesse) and Working Rings
(Arbeitsringe) composed of engineers and technicians who were chosen from various enter-
prises. At the end of 1943 the Minister of Economic Affairs' jurisdiction of supervising all
economic control except that over the armament industry proper was transferred to the
Minister of Armament and Var Production in large part because a borderline between arma-
ment industry proper and armament industry no longer could be maintained. As a result
of this transfer, the Minister of Armament and War Production created, in addition to the
existing agencies, new agencies, namely, Main Production Committees (PrcdhtionShar p!aus-
schuesse) and Production Committees (Produblionsausschuesse). Armament Boards (Rues-
tungskomrnissiore), Armament Inspections (Ruestungsinspetlionen) Armament Commands
(Ruestungskommandos), Army District Delegates (Wehrkreisbeauftragte), District Delegates
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ones, whether to employ the Nazi technique of economic control 99 or
to set up new principles of control.
Under such circumstances it is self-evident that only a staff of
highly qualified military and civilian officers will be able to solve these
and many other problems. Knowledge of the language and of the
political and economic structure of the enemy country will be pre-
requisites for the qualification of these officers."' 0 To supply them with
broad lines of policy and with some, perhaps obsolete, guidebooks will
not be sufficient.
(Bezirksbeauftragte) and Armament Chairmen (Ruestungsobmaenner) were charged with the
supervision of factories and plants. In building up this complicated system of control the
Ministers used the previously established organization of the entire German industry and
trade into Reich Groups (Reichsgruppen), Economic Groups (Wirischafisgruppen), Trade
Groups (Fachgruppen) and Trade Sub-Groups (Unterfachgruppen) for the purpose of "ap.
pointing them Economic Control Offices, Quotaholders and Main Production or Production
Committees.
99. Originally the so-called base period system was employed, i.e., the manufacturer
was permitted to process a certain percentage of the raw material which he had used within a
certain base period. Since this control system still permits production of non-essential goods,
it was later abandoned. A great many "L and M Orders" were issued, in fact so many that
they had to be revised and simplified at the end of 1942. In addition, the device of "universal-
.check" (Universalscheck) and "universal-transfer-certificate" (Unihersal.Ilebertragungs.
schein) was introduced by the head of the various "War Production Boards" in conformance
with a decree issued by the Minister of Economic Affairs. Raw material was now allocated
in form of a check issued by the War Production Board to the manufacturer. The latter
endorses the check to the dealer from whom he wishes to obtain the material. The dealer
may endorse the check to the producer who has either to preserve it or to turn it over to the
War Production Board whi6h had issued it. If the amount of raw material allocated to the
manufacturer must be obtained from several dealers, the manufacturer may issue to them
so-called "universal-transfer-certificates" (Universalebertragungsscheine) on the strength
of the check which he retains. Recently, the economic control procedure has been ex-
tremely tightened. Goods may be produced only on the basis of specific directives (Herstel.
lungsanweisungen).
100. The difficulty of finding qualified officers must not be underestimated. It should
therefore be seriously considered to utilize the services of many of those experts who have
come to the United States in recent years and whose loyalty to this country is beyond doubt.
Some government agencies have availed themselves of this unique opportunity to some
extent. Their experience with them has justified their policy.
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